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Abstract
We consider a monopolist selling durable goods to consumers with unit demands
but different preferences for quality. The seller can offer items of different quality
at the same time to induce buyers to self-select, as in Mussa-Rosen (1978), but is
not artificially constrained to offer only one such menu. Instead the seller can offer
without precommitment a sequence of menus over time. In the two-buyer case where
the seller has complete information about each buyer's marginal valuation for quality,
the seller's profits exceed what can be obtained from a single menu and sometimes
approximate the profits of a perfectly discriminating monopolist. This result is no
mere artifact of the assumption of complete information. As we show, even if the
seller has incomplete information about the realized distribution of buyer types, he
still may obtain higher expected profits (sometimes the entire surplus) by making a
sequence of offers rather than a single offer.
1. Introduction
Consider the seller of a durable good. Suppose buyers want at most one item but
differ in their willingness to pay for quality. Since buyers differ, the seller has an
incentive to price discriminate; but assume he cannot offer an item to any buyer
without making it available to everyone else. To price discriminate, the seller must
induce buyers of one type to purchase a particular item while buyers of a different
type purchase a different item.
In principle, the seller can induce such self-selection in two ways. At any given
time, he can offer items of different quality which will have differing appeal to the
heterogeneous buyers. Alternatively, the seller may be able to induce intertemporal
self-selection since anticipation of his future offers may lead some types of buyers to
purchase a current item while others prefer to wait for something more appealing.
Each of these forms of self-selection has been studied extensively in the literature-
but mainly in isolation. For example, Coase's conjecture about the unprofitability
of durable-goods monopoly spawned a literature on intertemporal self-selection; but
since the monopolist in this literature offers items of only a single quality, he cannot
induce self-selection at a point in time.1 Mussa and Rosen (1978), on the other hand,
examine self-selection at a point in time; but by constraining their monopolist to
offer only a single menu of items, they eliminate the possibility of intertemporal self-
selection.
We consider here the problem of a durable-goods monopolist who can make a
sequence of offers to two heterogeneous buyers with unit demands but who cannot
precommit. Since each buyer purchases at most one unit, the monopolist sells at most
two units regardless of the number of offers he makes. We examine the case where
the seller observes the valuation of each buyer and also the case where the seller is
uncertain about the realized distribution of buyer types.
Suppose initially that the seller has complete information about the valuations of
the two buyers and can make only a finite number of offers. If both buyers remain in
the final period of this finite-horizon game, the equilibrium is identical to what Mussa-
Rosen describe: in the absence of a corner solution, the monopolist finds it optimal to
offer a menu of items to induce self-selection. The optimal menu necessarily contains
items of inefficient quality and fails to extract the entire surplus.
In every period prior to the last, however, the monopolist finds it optimal to
abandon menus. Instead, he offers a single item of efficient quality based on his
observation of the marginal valuations of the remaining buyers.
Inducing self-selection over time turns out in this model to dominate inducing
self-selection at a point in time. The monopolist offers a single item of a particular
quality for sale and replaces it with an item of a different quality if and only if a sale
occurs. Although the next item offered is more attractive to the previous purchaser
than the item he actually purchased, that buyer is nonetheless rational to purchase the
previous item. For he anticipates that the seller would not have made the subsequent
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item available until the previous item was purchased. By utilizing intertemporal
self-selection-instead of point-in-time self-selection-the monopolist avoids having
to distort the quality of the second item in order to make it unattractive to the first
buyer; instead, he makes the second item unavailable (to either buyer) until the prior
item is purchased.
The benefit of using intertemporal self-selection is that the monopolist can dis-
pense with sales of inefficient quality. The cost is that he must space out his sales
rather than make them at the same time. However, this cost becomes arbitrarily
small for sufficiently high discount factors (i.e. a sufficiently short interval between
offers).
For such discount factors, the monopolist can increase the present value of his prof-
its relative to Mussa-Rosen's ingle-offer case and sometimes receives approximately
the present value obtained by a perfectly discriminating monopolist.
These results differ so markedly from the received wisdom on principal-agent prob-
lems (whether interpreted as applying to second-degree price discrimination, optimal
regulation, or optimal income taxation) that readers may wonder whether they are
artifacts of some assumption about the time horizon, the number of buyers, or the
information structure. For this reason, we also consider a two-buyer game with com-
plete information where the monopolist can make an unlimited number of offers in
succession. The equilibrium we consider has the same characteristics as in the finite-
horizon case: no multi-item offers, no quality distortions, and, for discount factors
sufficiently close to one, a present value for the monopolist that approximates the prof-
its from perfect price discrimination. An equilibrium with these same characteristics
exists for the infinite-horizon, complete-information game with any finite number of
buyers.2
Other readers may wonder whether our results are artifacts of the assumption of
complete information. For this reason, we show that our results persist in two-period,
two-buyer games where the seller is uncertain about the realized distribution of buyer
types. That a seller with incomplete information can benefit from making a sequence
of offers instead of a single offer (and can sometimes achieve the expected profits of
first-degree price discrimination) even for a discount factor of one may be surprising
to readers familiar with the literature on noncooperative bargaining games. For in
one-buyer games where the seller makes each offer and cannot observe the buyer's
valuation, a common conclusion is that there is no advantage to making a sequence of
offers instead of a single offer if the players' discount factor is sufficiently high.3 The
presence of more than one buyer sometimes creates opportunities for the seller which
have no counterpart when he faces only one buyer. In the class of equilibria that
we consider, the opportunity to make a sequence of offers increases the monopolist's
profits only if there is some correlation between the buyers' types.
A clearer perspective on our results can be gained by viewing them in the context
of a quite different literature. Arrow (1986) and Holmstrom (1982) have shown that
a seller with complete information can extract the full surplus from buyers even when
the seller is legally barred from making specific qualities unavailable to some buyers,
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provided he can condition the price paid for each item on the collective behavior of
all buyers. Demski and Sappington (1984) and Cremer and McLean (1985) (among
others) have shown that even with incomplete information, a seller can often extract
the full surplus from risk-neutral buyers if prices are allowed to depend on the buyers'
collective behavior and the buyers' types are correlated.
Arrow (1986) has criticized such contracts as involving "collective punishment." In
contrast the contracts offered by the Mussa-Rosen monopolist do not involve collective
punishment since the net utility which a buyer can achieve in a period does not depend
on the contemporaneous behavior of the other buyers. If a seller makes a sequence of
such offers, however, he will take prior buyer behavior into account when formulating
his current offer. The payoff to one buyer will then depend on the prior behavior of
the other buyer even if it does not depend on his contemporaneous behavior.
Our paper investigates under both complete and incomplete information the de-
gree to which a sequence of offers-none of which involves contemporaneous collective
punishment-serves as a substitute for a single offer involving such punishment. We
identify cases under both complete and incomplete information where the monopolist
extracts the full surplus; more generally, we find that the monopolist achieves a higher
surplus using a sequence of offers than he does with a single offer.
In the next section, we examine the multi-offer, complete-information game with a
finite or unbounded horizon. Section 3 extends our results to incomplete information
and section 4 contains some concluding remarks.
2. Optimal Sequential Offers Under Complete Information
In this section, we consider the gains which the monopolist can achieve by making
a sequence of offers to the two buyers instead of a single offer. Making a sequence
of. offers is advantageous because it induces buyers of different types to purchase in
different periods. For discount factors sufficiently close to one, we will show that the
monopolist can always increase the present value of his profits by making a succession
of single-item offers.
We model the problem as a multi-period game, with the periods indexed by t =
1,2... T. There are two stages in each period. In the first stage, the monopolist makes
an offer consisting of a menu of items, with each item fully characterized by its quality
level and price. In the second stage, each buyer simultaneously chooses whether to
select a single item from among those offered or to continue to the next period.
Buyers are assumed to have unit demands and select at most one item during the
course of the game. Since the monopolist makes an offer in each period, the horizon,
T, corresponds to the maximum number of distinct offers that the monopolist can
make during the game. When T is infinite, the number of offers that the monopolist
can make is unbounded.
If buyer i purchases an item of quality qj in period t, and pays price p;, then he
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obtains the utility (discounted to t = 1):
U; = #*'~1 (viqi - p;) , (1)
where 3 is a discount factor assumed to be the same for all players and v; is a positive
constant. We assume that 1 > #i> 0 and that v1 > v2 > 0. A buyer who chooses not
to purchase in any period receives a utility of zero.
If buyer 1 accepts (pr, q) in period t1 and buyer 2 accepts (p2, q2) in t2, then the
present value received by the monopolist is:
V = 1 (p1 - c(q1))+3t2-1(p2 - c(q2)) . (2)
If only the single buyer i purchases during the game (in period t;), then the monopolist
receives #*i-1 (p= - c(qj)), and if neither buyer makes a purchase then the monopolist
receives zero. Assume that c'(q), c"(q) > 0 for all q, that c(0) = 0, and that v2 >
c'(0) 4.
The marginal valuations for quality, v1 and v2, are assumed to be common knowl-
edge. Throughout this section, we also assume that the monopolist has complete
information and knows the type (marginal valuation) of each specific buyer but that
he is legally barred from using this information to make separate offers to each type
of buyer.
A player's strategy in each period specifies his action in that period as a function
of time and anything else that he can observe - for example, the sequence of previ-
ous offers, the number of buyers purchasing specific price-quality pairs, the periods
in which various items were purchased, the marginal valuations of the buyers who
remain, and, for the buyers, the menu of prices and qualities offered in the first stage
of the current period. The monopolist's strategy in each period specifies his offer
in the first stage of the period as a function of these things. Similarly, a buyer's
strategy specifies which price-quality pair (if any) to accept in the second stage of
each period. The monopolist chooses his strategy to maximize the present value of
his profits. Each buyer chooses a strategy to maximize his own utility.
Mussa-Rosen (1978) assumed that the monopolist's first offer was also his last
offer (T = 1). For purposes of comparison, we begin by briefly summarizing their
findings. In the subgame-perfect equilibrium of this one-offer game, the monopolist
adopts the following strategy. The monopolist offers (pi, qi) and (P2, q2) in order
to:
max (P1 - c(qi)) + (P2 - c(q2)) (3a)
subject to the constraints:
pi, q; > 0Ofor i= 1,2
vigi- pi > 0 (3b)
v 2 -p2 > 0 (3c)
vigi- pi v1 2 - P2 (3d)
v2q2 -p 2 v2 1 -p 1 . (3e)
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The optimal strategy for each buyer in the second stage is to choose the best
item offered in the first stage that generates nonnegative utility. Equations (3b)
and (3c) are "participation" constraints indicating that buyers will only purchase
items which generate nonnegative utility. Equations (3d) and (3e) are "self-selection"
constraints. Equation (3d) states that (pi, q), the item intended for buyer 1, will only
be purchased by buyer 1 if it generates utility for him that is at least as high as the
utility generated by the alternative item. Equation (3e) has a similar interpretation
for buyer 2.
The optimization problem specified by equations (3a) through (3e) has been exten-
sively analyzed in the literature: the optimization has a unique solution; moreover, at
the optimum, the self-selection constraint for buyer 1 and the participation constraint
for buyer 2 are binding.
By solving the binding constraints (equations (3c) and (3d)) for pi and p2 and
substituting the resulting expressions in equation (3a), we obtain a strictly concave
objective function in q and q2 which is maximized subject only to the nonnegativity
constraints for q1 and q2. Solving the resulting optimization problem, we obtain
for q: vi - c'(qi) = 0. As for q2, there are two possibilities: Either q2 > 0 and
2v2 - vi - c'(q2) = 0 or, alternatively, q2 = 0 and 2v2 - 1 - c'(0) < 0 . In this "corner
case," the interpretation of q2 = 0 is that buyer 2 is not served. In either the interior
or the corner case, the binding constraints (3c) and (3d) can be solved to yield the
optimal prices (pi).
If 2v2 -vi - c'(0) > 0, then it is optimal for the monopolist to sell to both
buyers. Let (pf'R, qfR) denote the item purchased by a type i buyer in this case.
It will be convenient to define the following additional variables for the interior case:
;MRSVMR, and U;IR. Let irR denote the profit the monopolist derives from the
type i buyer when both types buy:
jMR =MR -_ ~M ).(4)
Let VMR denote the sum of the payoffs which the monopolist collects from the
buyers in this case:
VMR -rjBMR +AMR . (5)
Let U;R denote the equilibrium payoff of buyer i in this case. That is, U2IR =
v2q2 R- -pR = 0andUMR = v1iMR _MR
In contrast, recall that a perfectly discriminating monopolist with complete infor-
mation is less heavily constrained. He can offer an item to one buyer while making it
unavailable to the other buyer. Therefore his objective function is the same as (3a)
but he is restricted only by the two participation constraints (3b and 3c )-and not
by either self-selection constraint. The profit obtained from each type i buyer will be
v~qj - c(q;). The optimal item for such a monopolist to offer to a type i buyer has a
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price and quality level denoted by (pet, ql'') and specified by the equations:
pl" = viq=",(6a)
c'(q ")= v . (6b)
Since the monopolist can extract all of the surplus from each buyer, he offers each
the "efficient" quality level (which maximizes total surplus).
Let rI'* denote the profit that the monopolist obtains when a type i buyer accepts
the optimal take-it-or-leave-it offer specified in equations (6a) and (6b).
'r1t = p='t - c(q t ) . (7)
The buyer with the higher marginal valuation for quality (buyer 1) always receives
the same quality level from the Mussa-Rosen monopolist as he would from a perfectly
discriminating monopolist. Since the offer of the perfectly discriminating monopolist
would violate the self-selection constraint of buyer 1, the Mussa-Rosen monopolist
can never extract the entire surplus.
We now consider the case where T > 1. We consider in turn the two parameter
regimes which gave rise in Mussa-Rosen's single-offer case, respectively, to corner
and interior equilibria. In each case, we begin by describing the subgame-perfect
equilibrium strategies for each of the three players. Having described them, we then
verify that each strategy is optimal in every subgame given the other strategies.
In the "corner" regime where 2v2 - vi- c'(0) < 0, the following strategy combina-
tion forms a subgame-perfect equilibrium in both the finite- and the infinite-horizon
games. In each period, each buyer accepts the best offer (if any) of those which
generate nonnegative utility for him. We refer to this strategy as the "get-it-while-
you-can" strategy since the buyer seizes the first opportunity for surplus as if no
future opportunities might present themselves.
The monopolist uses the following strategy in period t. If buyer 1 or both buyers
remain in the game at the beginning of the period, then the monopolist offers the
single price-quality pair (p1 St, q8t) defined by equations (6a) and (6b). If only buyer
2 remains, then the monopolist offers the single price-quality pair (pyS, qgst).
Next, we verify that these strategies are subgame perfect. In both finite- and
infinite-horizon games, no buyer can ever obtain positive utility when the monopolist
uses the proposed strategy. Hence, it is optimal for each buyer to use the get-it-while-
you-can strategy in each period.
Finally, we verify the optimality of the seller's strategy when buyers use the get-
it-while-you-can strategy in each period. In any period with only one remaining
buyer, the proposed strategy is clearly optimal for the monopolist since it extracts
the maximum possible surplus from this buyer.
Suppose instead that both buyers remain. Any price-quality pair (with q > 0)
that generates nonnegative utility for buyer 2 generates strictly positive utility for
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buyer 1. Hence, it is infeasible-given the buyers' strategies-for the monopolist to
sell only to buyer 2. This leaves the monopolist two choices: sell immediately to
both buyers or sell only to buyer 1. Among all the offers which only buyer 1 would
accept, the proposed offer is clearly optimal for the monopolist since it extracts the
maximum possible surplus from buyer 1. Moreover, since for this parameter regime
a corner solution is optimal in the single-period game, the profit from selling only to
buyer 1 must strictly exceed the profit from selling simultaneously to the two buyers.
Indeed, if at least one future period remains the proposed strategy is even more
profitable than in the single-offer case since the opportunity to make future offers
enables the seller to extract the entire surplus of buyer 2 in the next period. Hence, the
proposed sequential strategy results in the following present value for the monopolist:
Vs = flat + /dt. (8)
The above arguments demonstrate that when 2v2 - vi - c'(0) < 0, the proposed
strategy combination constitutes a subgame-perfect equilibrium for the complete-
information game with any horizon length, either finite or infinite. Moreover, these
strategies constitute a subgame-perfect equilibrium for any discount factor between
zero and one. In any game in which the monopolist can make two or more offers
(T > 2), the monopolist receives the equilibrium present value specified in equation
(8). This present value strictly dominates the profit obtained by a static Mussa-Rosen
strategy and approaches ri"at+ i"a, the profit obtained by a perfectly discriminating
monopolist, as the discount factor approaches one.
We now consider the "interior" regime where 2v2 - vi - c'(0) > 0. Since we
are ultimately interested in the play of the game when the time interval between
successive offers becomes negligible, we focus on the equilibrium strategies when the
discount factor pertaining to the interval between offers approaches one.
For discount factors sufficiently close to one, the subgame-perfect equilibrium
strategies in the finite-horizon game may be described as follows. Buyer 2 uses the
get-it-while-you-can strategy in each period. Buyer 1 uses the get-it-while-you-can
strategy in any subgame where he is the sole remaining buyer. In addition, buyer 1
always uses the get-it-while-you-can strategy in the final period of the game (t = T)
whether or not buyer 2 remains. Finally, if both buyers remain prior to T, buyer 1
uses the get-it-while-you-can strategy in the current period whenever he anticipates
being the only remaining buyer from the next period onward; buyer 1 will anticipate
being isolated if he observes that some item currently offered by the monopolist will
provide nonnegative utility for buyer 2.
If both buyers remain prior to T and if buyer 1 observes that no item offered
will yield nonnegative utility to buyer 2, then buyer 1 is more selective: in the cur-
rent period t he will accept the best price-quality pair (if any) of those that gener-
ate utility (discounted to period 1) greater than or equal to the reservation utility
(also discounted to period 1) #T-1UfR. Buyer 1's strategy is a generalization of the
get-it-while-you-can strategy for the case where the discounted reservation utility is
13T-1U R.
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As for the description of the seller's strategy, he will offer a single item of efficient
quality priced so as to extract the entire surplus in any period where only one buyer
remains. If both buyers remain in the final period, the monopolist will offer the
Mussa-Rosen menu. If both buyers remain prior to T, the monopolist will offer the
single quality gi't at a price p(t) which is given by the equation:
p(t) = (1 - f3 Tt)pat +#fT~t1 MR. (9)
In equilibrium, buyer 1 accepts (p(1), git) in the first period and buyer 2 accepts
(plat, gt) in the second period.
To verify that these strategies are subgame perfect, note first that the get-it-while-
you-can strategy is optimal for buyer 2 since he can never obtain positive utility
when the monopolist uses his equilibrium strategy. For the same reason, the get-it-
while-you-can strategy is optimal for buyer 1 when he is the sole remaining buyer.
Since a failure to accept an offer in the final period results in zero utility, the get-it-
while-you-can strategy is also optimal for buyer 1 in the final period whether or not
buyer 2 remains. Finally, if the monopolist offers a price-quality pair that provides
nonnegative utility for buyer 2, then buyer 2, using the get-it-while-you-can strategy,
will accept it; buyer 1 can therefore expect only zero utility in future periods, and
the get-it-while-you-can strategy is also optimal for him in this case.
If both buyers remain prior to T and the monopolist offers no item in period t
which gives buyer 2 nonnegative utility, then buyer 1 anticipates that buyer 2 will
remain and that the seller will offer q't in the next period at a price of p(t + 1)
defined in equation (9). For all t + 1 < T, equation (9) implies that p(t + 1) > pfMR.
Hence, the previous analysis of the single-offer game indicates that buyer 2 will reject
such an offer. More generally, buyer 1 can anticipate that as long as he declines to
purchase, the monopolist will continue to offer (p(s), git) in any period t < s < T and
that buyer 2 will continue to reject these offers. Moreover, by substituting equations
(6a) and (9) into equation (1) and using the fact that UMR = pa t -fR, it is
straightforward to verify that buyer 1 obtains the same discounted utility, 3T-1UR,
by accepting any of the offers (p(s), qt).
Finally, suppose that buyer 1 declines to purchase until the final period. In this
case, he can anticipate that as his final act the monopolist would offer the Mussa-
Rosen menu and that buyer 1 would again earn the discounted utility #T-1UMR by
accepting an item from this menu. Hence, in any future period including the last,
the buyer expects to obtain the discounted utility #T-1Uf'R if he fails to accept the
monopolist's offer in period t when both buyers remain. It is thus optimal for buyer
1 to accept the best offer in period t of those that provide discounted utility greater
than or equal to #T-1UfR; that is, it is optimal for buyer 1 to use the generalized
get-it-while-you-can-strategy with discounted reservation utility #T-1UPR.
To complete the verification of subgame perfection, we consider the optimality
of the seller's strategy. As in the other parameter regime, the proposed strategy is
clearly optimal for the monopolist in any subgame with one remaining buyer since it
extracts the maximum possible surplus from such a buyer. Moreover, as previously
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noted, the Mussa-Rosen menu is optimal for the monopolist in the final period when
both buyers remain.
If two buyers remain prior to the final period, the monopolist has two choices just
as in the previous parameter regime: sell immediately to both buyers or sell only to
buyer 1. We now verify that, for sufficiently high discount factors, the seller will never
make an offer containing two items prior to the final period. To sell simultaneously to
both buyers, the monopolist must provide buyer 2 with nonnegative utility. But this
will make buyer 1 anticipate isolation and he too will accept the best offer generating
nonnegative utility. The analysis of the single-offer game demonstrates that when
both buyers require nonnegative utility to participate and 2v2 - v1 - c'(0) > 0, the
static Mussa-Rosen offer is the most profitable two-item offer for the seller and results
in a payoff of 7 R + it R.
The monopolist can easily dominate this best two-item offer provided he can
make at least one future offer (that is, if t < T). For, suppose the monopolist simply
deleted the lower quality item from the Mussa-Rosen offer. Buyer 2 will not accept
the remaining item since it provides him with negative utility (as it did when it
was part of the Mussa-Rosen menu). On the other hand, buyer 1 can obtain the
discounted utility of /3-lUfR by accepting the remaining item in period t. Since
3t1U1MR > #3T-1UR, buyer 1-using his equilibrium strategy-would purchase the
item. Hence, the monopolist can anticipate that buyer 1 will accept the offer and
buyer 2 will reject it. The seller could then offer (p' t , gi) next period and, since
it would provide buyer 2 with nonnegative utility, could anticipate that the offer
would be accepted. This strategy yields the seller 7r11 + 1374 't. For /3 > /3* where
/3* - r2R/ 7 t this payoff strictly exceeds the payoff from the two-item Mussa-Rosen
offer.
Of course, this strategy-while superior to any two-item menu-is not the best
single-item offer. Recall that in any period t prior to the last period (t < T), if both
buyers remain and buyer 1 does not anticipate that buyer 2 will make a purchase in
period t, then buyer 1 will accept the best offer yielding discounted utility /3T1UJ.
The monopolist should therefore continue to offer gi't since that maximizes the total
surplus; but he should price it so as to extract all but the minimum surplus necessary
for buyer 1 to purchase. The price of the proposed dominating offer (pfr) is subopti-
mal since it gives UMR to buyer 1 when he requires, in terms of period t utility, only
3TtUMR. The optimal price should therefore be p(t) = pMR + (UMR - T-tUMR).
Using the fact that UR = p1t - pfR, we conclude that the optimal price for the
item of quality gq'1 is given by equation (9).
The above discussion demonstrates that the proposed strategies constitute a subgame-
perfect equilibrium in the two-buyer, finite-horizon game with complete information
for any #3 > #*'. In equilibrium, the monopolist sells a unit of quality qgi'* to buyer 1
in the first period at a price given by p(1) in equation (9) and makes the offer (pi"t,
gi"t) to buyer 2 in the second period. Substituting these prices and qualities into
equation (2) and collecting terms using equations (4) and (7), we obtain the following
expression for the equilibrium present value obtained by the monopolist in the play
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of the T-period game:
VT = (1 - #T-1)ri't + #T~1i MR +#/r*. (10)
For infinite-horizon games with complete information and sufficiently high /3, the
analysis when 2v2 - vi - c'(0) > 0 is virtually identical to the analysis for the pre-
vious parameter regime. In the infinite-horizon game, the use in each period of the
get-it-while-you-can strategy by each buyer and the strategy where the monopolist
offers a single-item menu which extracts the entire surplus of the remaining buyer
with the highest marginal valuation constitutes a subgame-perfect equilibrium. The
equilibrium present value obtained by the monopolist, VS, is given by equation (8).
As in the previous parameter regime, the get-it-while-you-can strategy is optimal
for each buyer since the buyers can anticipate only zero utility in future periods. The
strategy proposed for the seller is optimal if V5 > VMR. A comparison of equations
(5) and (8) indicates that Vs > VMR if /3> #/*. In the play of the equilibrium, the
monopolist makes the offer (p", gist) in the first period.
It can be verified by working backwards that whenever the horizon is finite the
subgame-perfect equilibrium is essentially unique.5 In contrast, there are a continuum
of equilibria in the infinite-horizon case. The particular infinite-horizon equilibrium
we discussed was chosen because the strategies supporting it are the limiting strategies
in the finite-horizon case for a sufficiently long horizon. Buyer 2 in either case accepts
the best offer in a period yielding nonnegative utility. Buyer 1 in the infinite-horizon
case also accepts such offers and in the finite-horizon case adopts the identical strategy
prior to T except when two buyers remain and no current item would give buyer 2
nonnegative utility. In such circumstances, buyer 1 purchases the best item offered
provided it yields /3T-1UIR. But this strategy becomes virtually the same as "get-it-
while-you-can" as T becomes large. Recall that when the monopolist is restricted to a
maximum of T offers, he makes the offer (p(1), q8i) in the first period, with p(l) given
in equation (9), and obtains the equilibrium present value, VT, given in equation (10).
For each fixed value of 3 greater than /3*, equations (8), (9), and (10) indicate that
the monopolist's first-period offer and present value in the T-period game approach
the infinite-horizon first-period offer, (p't, git), and the present value obtained in the
infinite-horizon game as T becomes large. (p(1) -+ p t and VT -+ Vs as T -> oo.)
As noted previously, Vs approaches the profit obtained by a perfectly discrimi-
nating monopolist as the discount factor approaches one.
3. Extension to Incomplete Information
We now consider a two-buyer game where the buyer types are random variables drawn
from a distribution that is common knowledge. As in the previous section, we assume
that there are only two possible buyer types (1 or 2) distinguished by their different
marginal valuations for quality, v1 > v2 > 0. Let e11 be the prior probability of the
event that both buyers are type 1, 022 the prior probability that both buyers are
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type 2, and 012 the probability that there is one buyer of each type. The seller does
not know the realized distribution of buyer types. In order to focus on games with
incomplete information, we assume that 9; # 1 for all i and j. For simplicity, we
also restrict attention to one-period and two-period games.
As we will see, the introduction of incomplete information alters none of our main
conclusions. Provided there is correlation between the buyer types, the monopolist's
(expected) profit once again may increase when he is given the opportunity to offer
a sequence of menus. Indeed, offering a sequence of menus permits the seller in some
circumstances, to extract the entire (expected) social surplus.
Making offers in sequence permits the monopolist to use information about one
buyer gleaned by observing the prior behavior of the other buyer. Such an opportunity
cannot arise in the two special cases which currently inform the literature on sequential
bargaining with one-sided information-the case with only one buyer and the case
with multiple buyers but independent types.
In the perfect Bayesian equilibria we investigate, the monopolist offers a single
item in the first period intended for type 1 buyers exactly as in section 2. He then
offers a menu of items in the second period as he does in unreached subgames of the
complete-information case.
As before, we begin with the single-offer game. In a game with either one or
two buyers where the seller does not know the realized distribution of buyer types,
the self-selection and participation constraints, equations (3b) through (3e), must
continue to hold. For the menu item (pi, qi) intended for a buyer of type i (i = 1, 2)
would be accepted by that buyer if and only if it gives him at least as much utility as
he would get from purchasing the other item on the menu or purchasing nothing at
all. As in section 2, these constraints imply the following relations between the prices
and quantities in any profit-maximizing menu where qi is intended for a type i buyer.
Pi = v1qi - (vi - v2)q2 , (11)
and
P2 = v2q2 . (12)
Although the self-selection and participation constraints remain the same, the
objective function in equation (3a) must now be replaced by the expected profit of
the seller:
i(p1 - c(ql)) + n 2 (p2 - c(q2)), (13)
where it; denotes the expected number of buyers of each type.6
Let gj't and pj"i = v~qf'* denote the quality and price which a perfectly discrimi-
nating monopolist would offer to a type i buyer. As in section 2, it is always optimal
for the Mussa-Rosen monopolist to offer a type 1 buyer the quality gi'* at a price
specified by equation (11). Replacing viqi by pi't in equation (11) and substituting
the resulting expression in equation (13) produces the following expression for the
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monopolist's objective function:
5j 1 (eit - [vi - v2 ]q 2) +2(v2q2 - c(q2)), (14)
where, as before, ir = v;ql" - c(qat ) denotes the profits obtained from a type
i buyer by a perfectly discriminating monopolist. Let WMR denote the expected
profits obtained by a Mussa-Rosen monopolist. An expression for WMR is obtained
by substituting the optimal value for q2 in equation (14).
In the rest of this section we restrict attention to two-period, two-buyer games
and perfect Bayesian equilibria of the following form.7 In the first period, the seller
makes an offer which would give type 2 buyers negative utility and hence does not
interest them. Let u be the utility a type 1 buyer would get from the best item on
such a menu. The type 1 buyer may accept this item always, reject this item always,
or accept this item with some probability. He will randomize if and only if he expects
a utility of u as well in the second period. Let a denote the probability that each type
1 buyer accepts the initial offer. In the equilibria we consider, the seller initially offers
the single item with quality qi°: and price pa - u. In the second period, the seller
offers a Mussa-Rosen menu based on his knowledge of a, his observation of whether
or not someone purchased one item in the first period, and which item, if any, was
purchased.8
Let q2(1, a) and q2(2, a) denote the qualities which the monopolist intends for
a type 2 buyer in the second period when one or two buyers remain and type 1
buyers accept the first-period offer with probability a. Combining the probability
of each sequence of purchases with the profits obtained in each case produces the
following expression for the expected present value of the seller in the equilibrium
under consideration:
EII = +2Oiua2{7atu}
+ 2411(1 - a)2#{rjt - (vi - v2)q2(2, a)}
+20 1 1a(1 - a) ({i18t - u)} + i- (vi - v2 )q2 (1,a))
+ e12a{rit - u +#[v2q2(1, a) - c(q2(1, a)
+ 012(1 - a)#3{ir - (vi - v2)q2(2, a) + v2q2(2, a) - c(q2(2, a)))}
+ 2022{v292 (2, a) - c(q2(2, a)) }. (15)
The quantity #i is the discount factor and the quantity 4ia - u is the profit obtained
from each type 1 buyer who accepts a first-period offer. EIU depends on both u and
a.
Now consider equilibria where the type 1 buyers mix with strictly positive prob-
ability in the first period and so must be indifferent between accepting and rejecting
the single item offered in the first period. If a type 1 buyer accepts, he gets u with
certainty; if he rejects, he gets either #3(vi - v2)q2(1, a) if the other buyer accepts the
initial offer or #l(vi - v2)q2(2, a) if the other buyer also declines it. (Equation (11)
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implies that a type 1 buyer receives (v1 - v2)q2 from the Mussa-Rosen offer.) Since
the type 1 buyer is indifferent between accepting and rejecting in the first period, it
must be the case that:
U =2a 1 1  (vi- v2 )q2 (1, a) + 1 - 2a 1 1  (vi- v2)92 (2, a), (16)209u + 0 / 12 ( 9 1
where 2a 1 1/(2011 + 012) is the probability that a type 1 buyer assigns to the event
that the "other" buyer makes a purchase.
We begin with a negative but illuminating result. We show for the special case
where the seller would offer the same menu in the second period whether or not a
purchase occurred in the first period that making a sequence of offers confers no
advantage in the class of equilibria under consideration. Denote the quality intended
for type 2 buyers in the second period regardless of whether one or two buyers remain
as 42(a).
If a = 1, then 42(a) = qi' since (pr", q") is the optimal second-period offer
when only type 2 buyers remain. In this case, u = /3(vi - v2)q'*t since this is the
minimum utility that will induce a type 1 buyer to purchase in the first period. If
0 < a < 1, then equation (16) implies that u = #O(vi - v2)42(a). In either case,
substituting q2(1, a) = q2(2, a) = q2 (a) and u = #(vi - v2)42(a) in equation (15) and
collecting the terms multiplying i", (v242 (a)- c(#2(a))), and (v1 - v2 )42(a) produces
the following expression for the expected profit of the monopolist:
EII = #{fi (.i't - (vi - v2)2(a)) + n 2 (v2 42(a) - c(2(a)))I}
+ (1 - ,#) [i1ai)t]. (17)
Equation (14) implies that the sum in braces in equation (17) is the expected profit
in a single-period game where the monopolist offers the most profitable feasible menu
which provides quality q'* to a type 1 buyer and <2 (a) to a type 2 buyer. The term in
square brackets in equation (17) is less than or equal to n1i't which is the expected
profit that a monopolist in a single-period game can obtain by offering the single-item
menu (pi", qt). Since the Mussa-Rosen offer is optimal in a one-period game, the
expected profit which it generates, WMR, is at least as large as that generated by
any other feasible menu including either of the two menus mentioned above. Since
EI is a beta-weighted average of two terms, neither of which strictly exceeds WMR,
the seller gains no advantage (for any admissible #) from the opportunity to make a
second offer.
The Mussa-Rosen menu when either one or two buyers remain in the second
period is determined by maximizing the objective function in equation (14) but with
ii; updated in accordance with Bayes' rule. Hence, when the expected number of type
2 buyers is strictly positive, the optimal menu depends on the monopolist's beliefs
only through the ratio of the (updated) expected number of type 1 buyers to the
(updated) expected number of type 2 buyers.
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Now consider a two-period game where the types of the two buyers are drawn
independently from some (two-point) distribution and the monopolist offers a single
item in the first period that type 1 buyers accept with probability a >.-0 (and type
2 buyers reject). Since we have excluded the degenerate case where 011 = 1, the
expected number of type 2 buyers in the second period will be strictly positive. Given
independence, the ratio of the expected number of type 1 buyers to the expected
number of type 2 buyers is the same whether one or two buyers remain in the second
period.9 Hence, the optimal menu is the same in these two cases. Together with the
previous result, this shows that when the types of the two buyers are independent,
the monopolist cannot increase his profits by engaging in the sort of intertemporal
price discrimination which we are considering.
When it is optimal for the monopolist to condition the menu he offers in the second
period on whether or not a purchase has occurred in the first period, intertemporal
price discrimination may be advantageous relative to the point-in-time price discrim-
ination of Mussa-Rosen. We now consider two examples where the monopolist does
increase his profits by making a sequence of offers. In our first example, the buyers'
types are perfectly, positively correlated. Our second example involves buyers with
negatively correlated types where by a suitable choice of parameters any correlation
coefficient between -1 and 0 can be considered.10 For simplicity, we also assume in
these examples that / = 1.
In our first example, 012 = 0 but 01n > 0 and 022> 0. The seller knows that
both buyers are the same type but is uncertain which type that is. The equilibrium
under consideration involves pure strategies and results in complete extraction of the
expected social surplus.
We begin by summarizing the strategies and beliefs of the players. Each buyer
believes the other buyer is the same type as himself. In each period, each type of
buyer accepts the best available offer provided it yields nonnegative utility. In the
first period, the monopolist offers (pBi", qit). If no one purchases, the seller believes
that he faces two type 2 buyers; if one buyer purchases, the seller believes that this
buyer was type 1 and hence infers that the other buyer is also type 1. In the second
period, if he observes 1 buyer remaining he repeats his initial offer; if he observes two
buyers remaining, he offers (pit, g28t).
We now turn to the optimality of this strategy combination. We consider first
the optimality of the buyers' strategies. In general, if a buyer anticipates that he will
receive zero utility in the future given the seller's strategy, then it is optimal for him
to accept the best item currently offered provided it yields nonnegative utility. For
this reason, the strategy of type 2 buyers is optimal in either period and the strategy
of type 1 buyers is optimal in the second period.
Consider next the optimality of the strategy of a type 1 buyer in the first period. If
the best item provides negative utility, then it is optimal for him to reject the offer. If
the best item provides nonnegative utility, however, it is optimal that a type 1 buyer
accept it. For, if he rejects it unilaterally, he anticipates that the other buyer-whom
he infers is a type 1 like himself-will purchase in the first period and upon seeing
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this single purchase, the seller will offer him (pi", qt) in the next period. Since such
an offer would generate zero utility, it is optimal for each type 1 buyer to accept the
best item in the first period generating nonnegative utility.
We consider now the strategy and beliefs of the seller. If the seller offers (pit, qit)
in the first period and no purchase occurs, the seller must conclude that both buyers
are type 2. Given that belief, his strategy of offering (pit, g") is clearly optimal.
If each buyer follows his equilibrium strategy, then the seller should never observe
exactly one purchase of his first-period offer (p 1 Bt, g t ). If the seller does encounter
this situation nonetheless, we postulate that the seller would conclude that a type 1
buyer purchased the initial item and that the remaining buyer is, therefore, also a
type 1. Although a seller would not be able to account for the failure of a type 1
buyer to purchase initially as his strategy dictates, at least such an error by a type 1
buyer does not reduce the buyer's payoff. In contrast, if a type 2 buyer had purchased
the initial item, his payoff would have been negative. Given the seller's belief that
the remaining buyer is type 1, his strategy of repeating the offer of (pl't, q8t) after a
single purchase is clearly optimal.
There is no need to verify that the initial offer of the monopolist is optimal since
the proposed strategy achieves the expected profits of perfect price discrimination
and no strategy could do better:
EII = 1 127ri't + 82 27r2j".
For the same reason, there is no need to specify the beliefs of the seller or the strategies
of players if the monopolist fails to offer (pit, git) in the first period.
In our second example, we assume that 01u = 0. Hence, the seller does not know
whether he faces one or two buyers of type 2. However, the analysis below is easily
extended to the case where 4 11 > 0 and #6 < 1.
As in the case of complete information, there are "interior" and "corner" parame-
ter regimes which determine whether it is optimal for the monopolist in a single-period
game to serve both types of buyer or only type 1 buyers. As was also the case for
the finite-horizon, complete-information game, the analysis of our second example is
somewhat simpler for the corner case but the results are similar for the two parameter
regimes..In the two-period, corner case, which is discussed below, it is straightforward
to show that the monopolist can always obtain an expected profit greater than the
static Mussa-Rosen profit by making a sequence of offers. In the two-period, interior
case, the monopolist's optimal strategy in the first period involves maximizing the
appropriate analog of the objective in equation (21) below. Numerical solutions of
this optimization for the interior parameter regime confirm that there is a wide range
of parameters for which the monopolist can increase his expected profit by making a
sequence of offers.
In accord with the discussion in the previous paragraph, we assume for simplicity
in what follows that:
1 > 912 v-V'=(0 (18)
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When this inequality holds, the optimal strategy for the monopolist in a single-period
game is to serve only the type 1 buyer (q2 = 0); hence, equation (14) implies that a
Mussa-Rosen monopolist would earn the expected profit WMR = 9127i",11
The following notation will be useful. Suppose that the monopolist makes a first-
period offer which a type 2 buyer would reject and a type 1 buyer would accept with
probability a. Let e12 (a) denote the updated probability that there is one buyer
of each type after both buyers are observed to reject this offer. From Bayes' rule it
follows that:
( 12= - a 12
12(a) = (19)
1 - 0912
Define ao via the equation:
1 012 - V
ao = 1 , (20)
0 12 1-V
where V is the ratio defined in equation (18). ao is the largest value of a for which
the inequalities in equation (18) are still (weakly) satisfied when 0 12 is replaced by
e12(a). Intuitively, if type 1 buyers accept first-period offers with sufficiently small
probability (a ; ao), then the observation that two buyers remain will still lead the
seller in the second period to make a single-item offer intended only for the type 1
buyer. Equations (18) and (19) imply that ao is strictly greater than 0 and strictly
less than 1.
Finally, we shall call a menu of items "type II" if it contains an item that provides
nonnegative utility to type 2 buyers and "type I" if it does not contain such an item.
We begin by summarizing the equilibrium strategies of the two buyers. In each
period, type 2 buyers purchase the best item offered if it yields nonnegative utility.
A type 1 buyer adopts this same strategy in the second period and also in the first
period when the menu offered is type II. Note that a type 2 buyer always accepts
some item from a type II menu but never accepts an item from a type I menu.
Faced with a type I menu in the first period, a type 1 buyer's strategy depends on
the maximum utility (denoted u) that he can obtain by accepting an item in the first
period. If u < 0, then the type 1 buyer rejects the seller's initial offer. Recall that a
type 1 buyer receives the utility (vi - v2)q2 from a Mussa-Rosen offer when q2 is the
quality of the item intended for type 2 buyers. Let Umaz = (vi - v2)q t. If u > umax,
then a type 1 buyer is assumed to accept the item that provides him with u. In the
event that several items provide this maximum utility, assume that he chooses from
among them the item of highest quality. For any maximnum utility u, we refer to the
highest quality menu item that provides a type 1 buyer with utility u as the "best
item" for the type 1 buyer. If u E [0, Umaz), then the type 1 buyer accepts the best
item on a type I menu with probability a(u) (and rejects all other items), where a(u)
is a continuous, strictly increasing function defined in the following paragraph .12
Let q2(2, a) denote the quality that a Mussa-Rosen monopolist intends for type
2 buyers in a two-buyer game where there is at most one type 1 buyer and the
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probability that there is exactly one buyer of each type is given by e12 (a). For
0 < U Uma,, let a(u) denote the largest value of a that satisfies the equation:
u = (vi - v2)q2(2, a). It is straightforward to verify that q2(2, a) is a continuous
function of a on the interval [ao, 1] and that a(u) is a continuous, strictly increasing
function of u on the interval [0, Uma,] .13 a(0) = ao and a(um,,) = 1.
We turn now to the equilibrium strategy of the seller. The seller's strategy in
the first period is defined in terms of the following construction. For 0 < u < Uma,
suppose that the seller were to offer the single item (pl't - u, qt) in the first period
and in the second period i. offer (pet, g't) after observing a single purchase, and ii.
after observing no purchases, offer the Mussa-Rosen menu which is optimal when the
probability that there is one buyer of each type is given by e12(a(u)). If the buyers
follow their equilibrium strategies, then EII(u), the expected profit that would be
obtained by the monopolist in this case, is given by the following specialization of
equation (15):14
EII(u) = 1(ri'*- u) + a(u) 1 2 a't
+ [2 - ®12 - a(u)e1 2 ]{v 2q2 (2, a(u)) - c(q2(2, a(u))) , (21)
where we have used the fact that u = (vi - v2)g2 (2, a(u)) and also substituted g'j
for q2(1, a). Since the functions a(u) and q2(2, a(u)) are continuous functions of u on
the closed interval [0, umax], EII(u) is a bounded, continuous function of u which has
a maximum on this interval.
Let u* denote a value of u that maximizes EII(u) on the interval [0, um..]. The
equilibrium strategy for the monopolist in the first period is to offer the single item:
(pl't - u*, gat).
We now consider the monopolist's second-period strategy. The monopolist ob-
serves what he offers in the first period and what, if any, items were purchased.
Based on these observations and his knowledge of the buyers' equilibrium strategies,
he revises his beliefs about the probability that there is a type 1 buyer remaining.
In particular, the seller observes in the first period either zero, one, or two purchases
from either a type I or type II menu. If two purchases occur, then the seller has no
choices left to make. If one purchase occurs, he can distinguish whether or not the
purchased item is the best item for a type 1 buyer. The beliefs and second-period
actions of the seller are summarized in Table 1.
[Table 1 goes here]
The seller's beliefs follow from Bayes' rule when it applies. As Table 1 indicates,
there are five cases where Bayes' rule applies. When the best item for a type 1 buyer is
selected from a type I menu and 0 < u < uma,, the seller realizes that this would occur
in equilibrium only when a type 1 buyer makes the purchase; he therefore believes
that no type 1 buyer remains in the final period. When no purchase occurs in the
same circumstance, the seller realizes that-even with a type 1 buyer present-this
happens with probability 1 - a(u); he therefore concludes that there is probability
0O2(a(u)) that one of the remaining buyers is type 1. If the seller offered a type
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Table 1. Seller's Second-Period Beliefs and Strategy
History Probability that a type 1 remains | Action
- -
Type II menu and
1 purchase
0 purchase
Type I menu with u E [0, Umax] and
1 purchase (not best for type 1)
1 purchase (best for type 1)
0 purchase
Type I menu with u > Umax and
1 purchase (not best for type 1)
1 purchase (best for type 1)
0 purchase


























Beliefs dictated by Bayes' rule
See text
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I menu but mistakenly made it worth u > Umax to a type 1 buyer and if the best
item for such a buyer was purchased, then the seller concludes that no type 1 buyer
remains in the second period. The seller also infers that no type 1 buyer is present
after observing zero purchases from such a menu. Finally, if the seller offered a type
I menu but mistakenly made it worth u < 0 to a type 1 buyer, then no purchases
should occur; if none does, the seller would retain his prior beliefs about the presence
of a type 1 buyer.
In the other five cases listed in Table 1, the seller observes behavior which is
inconsistent with the buyers' equilibrium strategies. For simplicity, we assume in all
such cases that the seller's expectations about the types of the remaining buyers are
formed using his prior beliefs. In particular, he believes when two buyers remain that
the probability that one of them is a type 1 is still e12 . If only one buyer remains,
the seller assigns probability (1/2)0 12 to the event that the buyer is a type 1.
We now verify that the proposed strategy for each player is optimal at each stage.
Since buyers of either type who purchase nothing receive zero utility, it is optimal
for anyone remaining in the last period-no matter what his beliefs-to purchase the
best item if it yields nonnegative utility. A type ,1 buyer can anticipate receiving only
zero utility in the second period whenever the first-period menu is type II. Faced with
such a menu, it is therefore also optimal for him to accept the best item in the first
period that yields nonnegative utility. For the same reason, it is always optimal for a
type 2 buyer to follow this strategy in the first period.
Now consider a first-period type I menu that provides maximum utility u to a
type 1 buyer. If u < 0, it is clearly optimal for the buyer to reject such an offer. If
u > um.,, then it is optimal for a type 1 buyer to accept the best item from this menu
since if he rejects it he will get utility equal to umax in the second period.
A type 1 buyer who in the first period rejects a type I offer that provides 0 < u <
umax receives utility (v1 - v2)q2(2, a(u)) in the second period. From the definition
of a(u) it follows that u = (v1 - v2)q2(2, a(u)), so that a type 1 buyer is indifferent
between rejecting and accepting such a first-period offer. In particular, it is optimal
for a type 1 buyer to accept the best item from such a menu with probability a(u).
Having shown that the strategy of each type of buyer is sequentially rational, we
consider the strategy of the seller. In two of the cases listed in Table 1, two buyers
remain and the seller retains his prior probability (0 12) that one of them is type 1.
Since the prior probability distribution gives rise to a corner in a one-period game, it
is optimal for the seller to offer (p}i", gi) in the second period. In four other cases
listed in Table 1, one buyer remains and the seller assesses the probability that he
is type 1 at (1/2)e12. In this circumstance, it is optimal for the monopolist to offer
the single item (pi", gi"t) in the second period for the same reason that this offer is
optimal in the static Mussa-Rosen game.15 In three of the cases listed in Table 1, the
seller assigns zero probability to the event that any remaining buyer is type 1. In this
circumstance, it is optimal to offer the single item (pf8, gi"t).
In the remaining case in Table 1, the first-period menu is type I and although
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u E [0, Umax], no purchases occur. Since the monopolist's updated beliefs are specified
by 012 (a), it is optimal for the monopolist in the second period to make the Mussa-
Rosen offer determined by these beliefs.
It remains to show that the seller's proposed strategy in the first period is optimal.
The monopolist can achieve WMR by offering the best type II menu initially or,
alternatively, by offering a type I menu with u < 0. However, these alternatives are
strictly dominated by offering a type I menu with u = 0. Suppose the monopolist
offered the single item (plat, gi'). Even this (possibly suboptimal) offer yields the
seller an expected profit EII(0) which strictly exceeds WMR. Using equation (21) and
the fact that q2(2, ao) = 0, we obtain the following expression:
EH(0) = 0 1 27x1' + ao12irst' = WMR + 12 t (22)
Type I menus with u > uma, are strictly dominated by the single-item menu
(pl' t - uma,, gi") since the latter would also always be accepted and gives away
strictly less surplus.
Of all items that provide utility u to a type 1 buyer, the item (pi't - u, qt)
provides the greatest profit for the seller. Together with the previous remarks, this
implies that the optimal initial offer of the monopolist is a type I menu containing
only a single item with quality q't offered at a price pl't - u for some u E [0, umaz].
In particular, the proposed strategy of offering the single item (pat - u*, q't) must
be optimal since u* was chosen to maximize the seller's expected profit, EH(u).
This concludes the demonstration that the specified strategies and beliefs consti-
tute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Since EH(u*) > EII(0) > WMR, the monopolist in this example can always in-
crease his profits relative to the static Mussa-Rosen case by making a sequence of
offers. However, he will not generally be able to capture the entire surplus. It is
either optimal for the monopolist to leave a type 1 buyer with utility u* > 0 or to
make the offer (pSt, git) in the first period. In the latter case, equation (22) indi-
cates that the monopolist's expected profit will be less than the total expected surplus
( e12xP'* + [2 - e12]4i' ).
The above example is a natural extension to incomplete information of the anal-
ysis of the "corner" parameter regime in section 2. Equation (20) implies that as
0 12 approaches 1, ao also approaches 1. Together with equation (22), this implies
that EH(0) approaches ri" + r'* as 0 12 approaches 1. Hence, the initial offer by
the seller which was exactly optimal under complete information is approximately
optimal (since it extracts almost the entire expected surplus) in this example as the
uncertainty about the aggregate population of buyers becomes small. Moreover, as
in the "corner" parameter regime with complete information and a discount factor
which approached one, the monopolist with incomplete information (and /3 = 1)
obtains approximately the surplus of a perfectly discriminating monopolist as 1
approaches 1.
Taken together, the results in this section indicate that correlation - either pos-
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itive or negative - is needed in the equilibria we consider if the seller is to benefit
from the opportunity to make a sequence of offers. Sequencing enables the seller
to make an offer to one buyer conditional on the prior response of the other buyer
even though, in contrast to a static direct revelation game, the seller is assumed to
be unable to condition his offers to one buyer on the contemporaneous responses of
the other buyer. Our second example with correlated types shows that the inability
to condition on contemporaneous behavior can prevent the monopolist from using a
sequence of offers to extract the full surplus from buyers.
In our two examples, the seller is uncertain about the realized valuations of the
buyers but no type 1 buyer is uncertain of the valuation of the other buyer. This
characteristic of our examples shortens the exposition but is not responsible for our
results. Given more space, examples could be described where allplayers are uncertain
and yet a sequence of offers leads to higher expected profits than a single offer; in
some of these examples the seller approximates the expected profits of perfect price
discrimination.
4. Concluding Remarks
The model in this paper is related to the one in Bagnoli et al. (1989) although
our focus there was entirely different. In the previous paper, we assumed that the
monopolist could not alter the quality of the durables he produced. Hence, every item
offered at a point in time had the same price, and inducing point-in-time self-selection
was infeasible. In addition, we assumed the seller had complete information about
the valuation of each buyer. Our focus in that paper was instead on Coase's famous
conjecture that in the continuous-time limit, buyers always receive the entire social
surplus.
The current paper contributes to the literature on second-degree price discrimina-
tion. That literature has focused on the benefits to a monopolist of inducing buyers
to self-select at a point in time by offering a single menu of items with different char-
acteristics. As our paper shows, when the monopolist is allowed to offer a sequence of
menus over time, the opportunity to induce intertemporal self-selection provides the
seller-whether he has complete or incomplete information-with a potent additional
means of extracting surplus when the discount factor is sufficiently high. In many
of the examples we consider, it is optimal for the monopolist to abandon multi-item
menus altogether and rely solely on intertemporal self-selection (except perhaps in
the last period, if one exists).
Our paper also provides a connection between the literatures on sequential bar-
gaining and mechanism design. The ability to make a sequence of offers provides
the seller with a degree of flexibility in pricing greater than that which is usually
assumed in static models of price discrimination but less than is usually assumed in
the literature on mechanism design.
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Footnotes
1. Contributions to this literature include Bagnoli, Salant, and Swierzbinski (1989),
Bulow (1982), Coase (1972), Fudenberg, Levine, and Tirole (1985), Gul, Sonnenschein
and Wilson (1986), Kahn (1986), Sobel and Takahashi (1983) and Stokey (1981).
2. The appendix of Bagnoli et al. (1990) extends our two-buyer, infinite-horizon
analysis to the case of a complete-information, infinite-horizon game where there are
initially a finite number of buyers of each of a finite number of types.
3. See Fudenberg, Levine, and Tirole (1985) for an example of a bargaining game
where a seller who can offer only a fixed quality is disadvantaged by the ability to
make an infinite sequence of offers rather than a single take-it-or-leave-it offer. Wang
(1991) studies both finite- and infinite-horizon single-buyer games where a monopolist
can offer menus of items with different qualities and concludes that multiple offers
provide no advantage.
4. The assumption that v2 > c'(0) is sufficient to ensure that both buyers are
served under perfect price discrimination and that at least buyer 1 is served in Mussa-
Rosen's problem.
5. A trivial multiplicity of equilibria arises because the seller can always add
items to the menu which are unacceptable to every remaining buyer. Even in the
absence of such items, a second trivial multiplicity of equilibria arises because of
buyer 2's indifference about accepting offers off the equilibrium path yielding zero
utility. However, the play of the game and the payoffs which result in these equilibria
are unique.
6. In the first period of the game, the expected numbers of buyers of each type
are related to the prior probabilities via the equations:
n1 = 2011 + 012
n2 = 20 2 2 +e 12 .
7. See Tirole (1988) for a discussion of the concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
8. For brevity, we will also refer to the single-item menu (p t , g8t) which is
optimal for the monopolist when he believes that all remaining buyers are type 2 as
a Mussa-Rosen menu.
9. Let r(2) denote the ratio of these expected values when two buyers remain in
the second period and r(1) denote their ratio when only one buyer remains. Bayes'
rule implies that r(2) = 2(10ei)2(11+(1-a)012 and r(1) - 2(1-a)e". Since independence
implies that 9?2 = 4e1ue 22, the reader can verify that r(1) = r(2).
10. To define correlation precisely, arbitrarily label the two buyers A and B and
define two associated random variables as follows. If A is a type 1, the associated
random variable has the value 1; if A is a type 2, the random variable has the value
2. Define the second random variable analogously to reflect the type of buyer B. The
F.1
correlation coefficient between these two random variables (p) can now be defined in
the standard way. We obtain the result:
On1- (6n + .5012)2
( 11 + .5812) - (11 + .5812)2
In our first example, the correlation coefficient is positive (p = 1). In the second
example, any negative correlation coefficient can be produced (-1 < p < 0) by a
suitable choice of 812.
11. For the two-buyer, single-period game with 01u = 0, it is the case that
n1 = 812 and n 2 = 2 - 812. Moreover, when equations (11) and (12) are substituted
into equation (13), the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the expected-profit-maximizing
qualities imply that q2 = 0 is optimal if and only if:
52v2 - 5 1(v1 - v2) - 52c'(0) 0 .
Substituting for A1 and n 2 in the above inequality and collecting terms results in the
inequality in the text.
12. For the parameter values in our second example, there is no perfect Bayesian
equilibrium where the type 1 buyer uses a pure strategy after every first-period offer.
For suppose that the monopolist offers a type I menu in the first period that provides
0 < U < Umax to a type 1 buyer. If the type 1 buyer's strategy is to accept such an
offer, then after zero acceptances are observed, Bayes' rule implies that both buyers
must be type 2. In this case, the monopolist optimally offers the single item (p8t,
q't) in the second period and the type 1 buyer could have obtained greater utility by
deviating from the proposed equilibrium strategy and rejecting the initial offer. On
the other hand, suppose that the type 1 buyer's strategy is to reject the previously
mentioned first-period offer. In this case, following zero acceptances, Bayes' rule
specifies that the monopolist's posterior beliefs must be the same as his prior beliefs.
With these beliefs, the monopolist optimally offers the single item (pl't, q't) in the
second period and the type 1 buyer could have obtained greater utility by accepting
the initial offer.
13. The definition of q2(2, a) implies that q2(2, ao) = 0 and q2(2, 1) = qt. More-
over, in the two-buyer game for which q2(2, a) is defined, the expected number of type
1 buyers is n 1 = 0 1 2(a) and the expected number of type 2 buyers is T2 = 2-0 12(a).
Given our assumptions about c(q), the Kuhn-Tucker conditions imply that q2(2, a) is
a continuous, strictly increasing function of a on the interval [ao, 1J. Hence, q2(2, a)
has a continuous, strictly increasing inverse on the interval [0, gi]. Gall this inverse
h(x). Then a(u) = h(u/(vi -v2)
14. For 0 % U Uma,, it is straightforward to verify that the item (pi'* - u, g"
provides negative utility for a type 2 buyer and so would be rejected by such a buyer.
The maximum price that a type 2 buyer would be willing to pay for an item with
quality qi't is v2qi". Using the fact that Uma, = (vi - v2)qi, it is easy to show that
pi*- Uma, > v2q1't -
F.2
15. In a game with a single buyer where the probability that the buyer is type 1
is (1/2)012, the expected number of type 1 buyers is l1 = (1/2)012 and the expected
number of type two buyers is n 2 = 1 - (1/2)012. Hence, the ratio n1/n 2 .is the same
as in the original two-buyer game. As we have already observed, the Mussa-Rosen
offer (with one or more buyers) depends on the monopolist's beliefs about the buyers'
types only through this ratio.
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